![]() ![]() non-naturalism distinction in metaethics, I see two ways of justifying hedonist axiology. Two motivations for hedonismįollowing the naturalism vs. ![]() They often seem based on (1) false consensus effects (“typical mind fallacy”), (2) a false reification of some intuitions about experiences, or (3) appeals to hedonism’s simplicity that derive most of their force from “moral realism is true” as a question-begging premise. I’ll discuss below why I think the hedonists’ arguments are flawed. While hedonists would say this is making a mistake, I don’t find their counters convincing. ![]() Robert Nozick’s experience-machine thought experiment (Nozick, 1974) suggests that at least some of us seem to care terminally about things other than positive and negative experiences. Finally, I conclude that people may endorse hedonism as their subjective value system (a personal choice) but not as objective morality. I then explain why I disagree with the view that introspection about the goodness of pleasure (or badness of pain) gets us to moral realism. As a theory of value (an “axiology”), it says that positively and negatively valenced experiences make up what’s morally good or bad for someone.īelow, I’ll introduce two motivations for hedonist axiology. Hedonism says that well-being consists of the felt quality of our experiences (Tännsjö, 1994). This is the seventh post in my moral anti-realism sequence it works well as a standalone piece. ![]()
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